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Contrary to the prevailing view that the Doha negotiations have achieved little, we find 
that on trade facilitation much progress has been made.  This is particularly true in 
regard to action by development banks and bilateral development agencies to meet 
client demand for assistance in reform.  Active private sector participation has been an 
important factor driving change.  Many agencies have been involved in this work; we 
find that their roles have been consistent with their comparative advantages. 
As to how the international community can best support continued progress, we 
conclude in favor of a cautious approach to the imposition of new WTO obligations in 
the area of trade facilitation. On the whole, this is the approach the WTO has taken, 
e.g., by limiting its negotiations on trade facilitation to several specific provisions of the 
GATT.  The WTO can continue to function as a catalyst for reform; it is perhaps uniquely 
placed to relate the trade facilitation agenda to the overall trade agenda.   
On design and construction of the relevant infrastructures and capacities to spur 
development, the development institutions, including bilateral agencies, should continue 
to lead.  We find little evidence to support the need for a comprehensive new “platform” 
or mechanism to channel trade-related aid as part of implementation of any new 
agreement at the WTO on trade facilitation.  We recommend, however, that an 
innovative approach to using the well established, but under utilized Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism be considered to increase transparency on where new aid is going over time 
and to expand understanding of where and how country-based progress has been 
achieved. 
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1. Content and objective of the paper 
 
In initiating the current round of multilateral negotiations, WTO Members 
committed themselves to pay particular attention to issues raised by developing 
countries – signaled by referring to the negotiations at the “Doha Development 
Agenda” rather than the “Doha Round.”  The commitment reflected two 
widespread perceptions of the Uruguay Round outcome: 
•  it was unbalanced, more favorable to the interests of developed Members 
than to developing Members, 
•  it created an “implementation problem” more severe than any created by 
previous GATT agreements. 
(The nature of these will be taken up in detail below.) 
WTO Members, in the Declaration that initiated the new round,
3 responded to 
these perceptions in two ways.  They renewed their commitment to treat 
developing countries generously, i.e., to special and differential treatment for 
developing countries,
4 and they promised to give special attention to 
implementation-related issues and concerns. 
 
Indeed, implementation is the first item in the Doha Declaration Work Program.  
In the documents that outlined the new negotiations WTO Ministers devoted 




The purpose of this paper is to explore how the implementation issue has 
evolved.  In this exploration we pay particular attention to trade facilitation.
6  It 
is the only “new area” in the agenda and the only place the negotiations have 
taken up the challenge to tailor obligations to particular conditions and of tying 
the legal obligation to implement WTO rules to a concrete commitment to 
provide assistance.  Moreover, trade facilitation involves activities such as 
transport, communications and public service efficiency that are economy-wide in 
scope.  Thus the trade facilitation discussion does take up the issue of how 
regulating their trade dimension can guide construction of institutions basic to 
the domestic economy.  
                                         
3 WTO (2001a) 
4 The Uruguay Round in contrast had emphasized “integrating developing countries into the 
multilateral trading system,” a slogan that signaled de-emphasis of special and differential 
treatment.  
5 The Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001a) and the additional decision on implementation-
related issues and concerns (WTO 2001b) 
6 Wilson (2005a) provides a framework for considering what is inside and outside the scope of 
WTO disciplines in regard to trade facilitation.   4
Our approach is a practical one.  We review what has been accomplished 
through WTO negotiations and through other means. e.g., bilateral and 
multilateral development agencies, we pull together lessons from these 
experiences.  We will look in detail at progress that has been made through a 
number of instruments that exist in the international community.  We look into 
the details of progress on trade facilitation in order to learn more about how the 
contributions of the different organizations fit together.  This part of our work 
was in part sparked by a Japanese contribution to the WTO
7 discussion that 
brought forward the idea that institutions have comparative advantages, their 
different structures and capacities should be taken into account in determining 
which of the international community’s different instruments are best suited to 
different parts of the development challenge.
8 
As to our findings, contrary to the pervading view that the Doha negotiations 
have achieved little, we find that on trade facilitation much progress has been 
made, particularly through development banks and bilateral development 
agencies.  Active private sector participation has been an important input.  Many 
agencies have been involved; we find that their roles have been consistent with 
their comparative advantages. 
As to how the international community can best support continued progress, we 
conclude in favor of a cautious approach to the imposition of new WTO 
obligations in the area of trade facilitation. On the whole, this is the approach the 
WTO has taken, e.g., by limiting its negotiations on trade facilitation to several 
specific provisions of the GATT.  The WTO can continue to function as a catalyst 
for reform; it is perhaps uniquely place to relate the trade facilitation agenda to 
the overall trade agenda.   
On design and construction of the relevant infrastructures and capacities, the 
development institutions, including bilateral agencies, should continue to lead.  
We find little evidence to support the need for a comprehensive new “platform” 
to channel trade-related aid.  We will suggest, however, that an innovative 
approach to using the well established, but under utilized Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) be considered to increase transparency on where new aid is 
going over time and to expand understanding of where and how country-based 
progress has been achieved. 
                                         
7 WTO (2003) 
8 An element of institutional rivalry often enters into such analysis, e.g., the WTO versus the 
World Bank.  We ask the reader – and ourselves – to keep in mind that these are all instruments 
created by the international community.  The issue in not “Which of these institutions is best?  
The issue is “How can we best use these institutions to advance our common objectives, 
development and poverty reduction?”   5
2. The Uruguay Round outcome and the 
implementation problem 
This part of the paper looks at the “implementation problem,” or in WTO 
language, “implementation-related issues and concerns.”  Do the 
“implementation-related issues and concerns” in the Doha Declaration address 
the “implementation problem” as it emerged from the coming into force of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements?  What progress has been made to address the 
implementation-related issues and concerns and the implementation problem? 
Origins of the problem 
The Uruguay Round “grand bargain,”
9 was that developing countries would take 
on obligations in new areas such as intellectual property and services in 
exchange for developed countries’ making significant market access concessions 
on products of export interest to developing countries – particularly 
textiles/clothing and agricultural products. 
The unbalanced outcome 
As Sylvia Ostry (2002) has explained, when the Uruguay Round Agreements 
were accepted their implications of were poorly understood, certainly not 
quantified.  As to what developing Members received, the newly tariffied 
schedules of protection of agriculture proved to be hardly less restrictive than the 
hodgepodge of non-tariff measures they replaced.  The commitment to remove 
quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing would take place 
mostly at the end of the 10-year phase-in period, not at the beginning.  
Moreover and less often noted, the economics of TRIPS (the agreement on 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property) dominates the economics of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.  For the United States and other intellectual 
property providers, the value of the claims TRIPS generates is several times 
larger than the gain to them from all the merchandise trade liberalization agreed, 
including the liberalization of their own restrictions.  For countries that mostly 
use intellectual property established elsewhere, the TRIPS-generated obligation 
to pay is several times larger than the gains they will enjoy from the Uruguay 
Round package of merchandise import liberalization.
10  Thus there emerged a 
concern that the basic GATT/WTO ethic of reciprocity or balance had been 
violated – developing Members had given more than they got. 
The implementation problem 
The Uruguay Round brought into the GATT/WTO system challenges that the 
original GATT had not taken on.  While the politics of agreeing to tariff 
reductions is difficult, to implement such an agreement provides no particular 
challenge.  New tariff schedules are printed and distributed to customs houses.  
                                         
9 Sylvia Austry’s (2002) description. 
10 Finger (2002) provides details.   6
The Uruguay Round however pushed past regulations aimed specifically at 
international trade into areas of behind-the-border institutions and regulations 
such as technical and sanitary standards, the protection of international property.  
While these matters are “trade-related” – they do affect international trade – 
they more basically provide the institutional structure of the domestic economy.  
Moreover, agreements in these areas took a form different from that of 
traditional agreements to reduce or eliminate barriers.  They require that 
countries’ regulations be harmonized to a common standard; e.g., every WTO 
Member must apply the same standard for defining and protecting intellectual 
property, must vigorously apply that standard to foreign-owned property. 
Implementation of the obligations undertaken in these agreements requires 
institution-building – not just removing restrictions.  This institution-building 
would demand significant investment in facilities, equipment, staff training, etc.  
Comparison of these agreements with development project experience revealed 
that significant investment was needed – more than a year’s development 
budget in many of the poorer WTO Members.  It also revealed that the demands 
of the agreements – taken in large part from current practice in the more 
advanced economies – are not always good development advice.  The 
expenditures demanded often are not those that maximize the trade impact, 
much less the development or poverty reduction impact of the resources.
11 
As discussion of implementation problems evolved, concern to make the WTO 
system more development-supportive sparked a discussion of the possibility that 
the dimensions of time and place be introduced into WTO obligations.  Perhaps 
obligations could be tailored to objective indicators of situation – move beyond 
the provision of phase-in periods based on no particular criteria to obligations 
tailored to objective indicators of situation and need.  Within the traditional 
bounds of the WTO, this issue offered a considerable challenge.  While a 
country’s rules and regulations in such areas as standards and intellectual 
property do affect trade, i.e., are “trade-related,” they more basically provide the 
structure of the entire economy.  Legal obligation would have to do more than 
spell out the (final) structure of such institutions in a developed economy, it 
would have to map out the steps and the schedules for building the institutions.  
WTO obligation – applied only to the trade dimension of such institutions – 
would have to map out how construction of the domestic economy could best 
proceed. 
 
Another part of the problem is that implementation assistance had been urged 
but not provided for in several of the Uruguay Round Agreements – 
implementation was a legal obligation, provision of assistance was not.  This 
imbalance fostered a discussion of how the legal obligation to implement might 
be linked to a legal obligation or other concrete commitment to provide 
assistance and prompted Rubens Ricupero to suggest that future proposals 
                                         
11 Finger Schuler (2001)   7
include an “implementation audit” that would identify the specific investments 
needed to meet new obligations – so that any agreement could include bound 
commitments to provided the needed support. 
At the WTO, the implementation challenge, in summary was to find ways to 
tailor WTO obligation to the specifics of individual countries’ situations, needs 
and development timetables and to tie the provision of assistance to the 
implementation of obligations. 
3. The implementation issue in the WTO 
Each of the WTO higher-level decisions since the Uruguay Round has taken up 
implementation.  In this section we will review those treatments. 
The Doha Ministerial Meeting 
WTO Ministers, at the 2001 The Doha Ministerial Conference, agreed to open a 
new round of negotiations.  They addressed implementation in the Ministerial 
Declaration (that provides the decision for a new round) and in a separate 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns: Decision of 14 November 2001. 
The Declaration states that the Ministers “attach the utmost importance to the 
implementation-related issues and concerns.”  It provides that on a subject on 
which there is a negotiating mandate, implementation will be part of the 
negotiation and that on other subjects the relevant WTO bodies will take up 
implementation issues as a matter of priority.
12  Another section confirms that 
technical assistance and capacity building are “core elements of the development 
dimension of the multilateral trading system.”  It calls for delivery coordinated 
among bilateral and international organizations and for secure and predictable 
funding for WTO technical assistance.  In addition, the Declaration reaffirms 
special and differential treatment as an integral part of the WTO Agreements and 
endorses the work program on special and differential treatment set out in the 
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns. 
The implementation Decision enumerates the Ministers’ implementation-related 
issues and concerns.  The content of the Decision is summarized in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Doha Decision on Implementation: Tabulation of Content by 
Subject 
Subject  Number 
of items
Use or extension of special and differential treatment provisions 
• less discipline on developing country policies 




Lengthen phase-in or phase-out (e.g., sanitary phyto-sanitary   
                                         
12 Paragraph 12, titled “Implementation-related issues and concerns.”   8
regulations, export subsidies)   10 




Technical assistance   
• to participate in the WTO or standards-related international bodies 




Reminder that Members have a legal obligation under TRIPS Article 66.2 
to provide incentives for their enterprises and institutions to promote 
incentives for their enterprises and institutions to promote 





Total  37 
Source: Tabulated from WTO (2001) MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, Fourth 
Session, Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001 Implementation-Related Issues And 
Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17, 20 November 2001.   9
As the tabulation indicates, the WTO Ministers at Doha framed the 
implementation issue within traditional conceptions of special and differential 
treatment: market access concessions by developing countries on products of 
export interest to developing countries, less than full reciprocity from developing 
countries in the market access bargaining, lesser application to developing 
countries of some of the system’s generic rules – or at least longer phase-in 
periods for developing countries to implement such obligations, developing 
countries supported by expanded trade-related assistance. 
Thus, as the Doha Declaration treats the issue of “implementation” and “special 
and differential treatment (SDT) ”, their conclusions are much the same.  
Moreover, they respond more to the nature of the Uruguay Round outcome than 
to the need to make obligations specific to circumstances and assistance specific 
to the need. As part of the SDT provisions of technical assistance, the WTO 
Secretariat continues to give priority attention to capacity building for LDCs in 
order to assist them to draw on the benefits of the rules-based trading system.
13  
The July 2004 Work Program and trade facilitation 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration announced agreement to undertake preliminary 
work on four new subjects for possible multilateral agreements: investment, 
competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation(“trade-related 
aspects of,” of course).  These would be taken up as negotiating issues only if 
the Members reached explicit consensus to do so at a future meeting. 
Limited scope 
The next WTO Ministerial Meeting, Cancun 2003, failed to agree on a work 
program.  The Doha Work Program agreed in July 2004
14 dropped all but trade 
facilitation from the negotiating agenda and limited coverage of the negotiations 
on trade facilitation to “clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII 
and X of GATT 1994.”  These articles take up Freedom of Transit,
15 Fees and 
Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation, and Publication and 
Administration of Trade Regulations.
16 
Link to assistance 
The 2004 Work Program (paragraph 1g) states in a sentence that the General 
Council agrees to commence negotiations on trade facilitation on the basis of the 
modalities set out in Annex D.  Annex D links developing country participation in 
the negotiations as well as the commitments they will undertake to their own 
                                         
13 WTO (2005). “Special and Differential Treatment for least-developed Countries”. Note by the 
Secretariat. WT/COMTD/W/135. 5 October 2004. 
14 WTO (2004) 
15 This is a matter of particular importance to landlocked countries, whose surface shipments of 
exports and imports must transit through other countries. 
16 The July 2004 Work Program furthered also the shift of WTO attention toward dealing with the 
implementation requirements of future negotiations rather than resolving those created by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.  The Work program devotes only eight lines in a 778 line document 
to “those elements of the Work Program which do not involve negotiations.” (paragraph 1.h)   10
implementation capacities and to the assistance that they will be provided.  
Paragraph 5 commits developed Members to ensure adequate assistance during 
the negotiations – so that developing and least developed countries can “fully 
participate in and benefit from the negotiations.”  Who is responsible for 
assistance on implementation is not specified.  Paragraph 6, in passive voice, 
states that “Support and assistance should also be provided” to help with 
implement of commitments. 
Perhaps the tightest link relates to “commitments whose implementation would 
require support for infrastructure development.”  Here, “developed-country 
Members will make every effort to ensure support,” but “where required support 
and assistance for such infrastructure is not forthcoming, and where a 
developing or least-developed Member continues to lack the necessary capacity, 
implementation will not be required.” (paragraph 6, emphasis added) 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
17 
The work program agreed at Hong Kong in December 2005 continued the 
emphasis on issues of interest to developing countries.  As to how these issues 
are perceived, “special and differential treatment” is particularly prominent; the 
phrase appears 23 times in the 45-page Declaration (including the annexes).  By 
comparison, “liberalize” or “liberalization” appears 9 times. 
The substance of such treatment includes liberalization of trade in products of 
export interest to developing countries, e.g., agriculture with emphasis on 
cotton, the commitment by developed Members to provide by 2008 duty and 
quota free access to imports of most products from least developed countries.  
Lesser liberalization by developing countries is also prominent.  Examples are 
smaller coefficients for developing countries on the formulas by which tariff cuts 
will be determined; least developed countries will be given an additional 7 years 
grace period on meeting the obligations of the existing agreement on trade-
related investment measures. 
The Declaration continues the consideration of aid or technical assistance to help 
developing countries to participate in negotiations and to implement obligations.  
(The word “assistance” appears in the declaration 34 times.)  It also broadens 
considerably the scope of assistance taken up: 
Aid for Trade should aim to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, 
to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure 
that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO 
Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade. (paragraph 57, 
emphasis added.)  
The same paragraph invites the WTO Secretary General to appoint a task force 
on how to make aid-for-trade operational, and to consult with other relevant 
organizations and agencies on these matters.  The aid for trade initiative was 
discussed at the G-8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005 hosted by the United 
                                         
17 WTO (2005)   11
Kingdom.  The summit announcement included financial commitments for trade 
aid.  The outlines of an aid for trade initiative were also discussed in a joint IMF/ 
World Bank paper for the 2005 spring meetings. At the spring meetings, the 
Development Committee and the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC) called on the Bank and Fund to work with others to develop 
more detailed proposals to help developing countries adjust to and take 
advantage of the Doha round.
18  There have been a number of studies and 
proposals on aid for trade over the past year, including proposals for new 
mechanisms to channel new assistance.
19  
 
4. The Negotiations on Trade Facilitation 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration reports that some 60 written submissions 
have been submitted to the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation.
20  These 
include: 
•  national experience papers describing reforms undertaken, 
•  proposed or suggested measures to improve and clarify the GATT articles 
covered by the negotiating mandate, 
•  proposed or suggested provisions for effective cooperation between customs 
and other authorities on trade facilitation and customs compliance, 
•  proposals or suggestions for enhancing technical assistance and support for 
capacity building on trade facilitation, and for the practical application of the 
principle of special and differential treatment. 
The proposals to clarify and to improve the GATT articles provide useful 
suggestions, e.g., 
•  China (TN/TF/W/26): There should be a reasonable interval (e.g., at least 30 
days) between the publication of regulations and their implementation or 
enforcement. 
•  The Republic of Korea (TN/TF/W/18) suggests that much paperwork and 
document-related costs can be reduced if the following suggestions were 
implemented: 
▫ Harmonization and standardization of document formats;  and 
▫ Use of a 'single window' where traders can submit all the necessary 
documents and data to a single agency.  (Para 7)  
                                         
18 The IMF and the World Bank (2005). “Doha Development Agenda and Aid for Trade” DC 2005-
0016, September 12, 2005. 
19 See for example, Hoekman, B. and Prowse, S. (2005) ‘Economic policy responses to preference 
erosion: from trade as aid to aid for trade’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3721. 
Stiglitz and Charlton (2006)  
20 The WTO Secretariat has compiled a useful tabulation of proposals. “WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON 
TRADE FACILITATION COMPILATION OF MEMBERS' PROPOSALS”. TN/TF/W/43/Rev.5, 3 
February 2006.   12
▫ Accepting copies of documents in lieu of originals for import and export 
can also greatly streamline the customs process.  Customs can, if 
necessary, always request the original documents at a later time. (Para 
10) 
•  Bolivia, Mongolia and Paraguay have provided suggestions for streamlining 
transit trade into landlocked countries, e.g., standardize the documentation 
requirements for transit through different countries, for different routes 
through the same country. 
Identifying concrete implementation needs/support 
Several Members have offered proposals on how to determine the assistance 
needs of individual developing countries with regard to proposed new 
obligations.  One of the more elaborate of these is from the European Union. 
(TN/TF/W/46)  The WTO and other organizations (the World Bank, Worlds 
Customs Organization, UNCTAD, OECD, regional development banks, etc.) would 
establish and operate a “platform” for international cooperation and coordination 
on the provision of technical assistance and capacity building for trade 
facilitation.  Its tasks would include: 
•  to take stock of trade facilitation needs, in relation to the 
provisions/obligations emerging from the negotiations, 
•  to help to identify if and what kind of technical assistance and support for 
capacity building would be needed to support implementation, over what 
time frame, by each developing Member. 
The United States has offered a similar suggestion without mention of a platform 
organization: 
The unique situation of each individual Member regarding implementation 
of the proposed commitment could be addressed early in the negotiations 
through the use of diagnostic tools providing an assessment of specific 
needs, which can lead to appropriate and workable transition periods 
combined with assistance targeted at individual situations. (TN/TF/W/13, 
Section V.) 
The flaw in the schemes to conduct implementation audits is not in the 
underlying ideas; it is that they have not been executed in a systematic 
manner based on a common analytical framework or data.  The Doha 
negotiations have been under way since 2001, but no such platform has been 
created and no implementation audits have been conducted – for any of the 
proposals.
21 
                                         
21 Perhaps the negotiations work program should have required that each proposal include such 
an implementation audit.  The World Bank in cooperation with the WTO are in the process, 
however, of conducting a series meetings in developing countries to discuss costs of 
implementation of a new agreement on trade facilitation, with support provided by several 
bilateral donors.   13
Development bank experiences suggest that it will not be possible to conduct 
implementation audits in time to incorporate their results in agreements that this 
round of negotiations will reach.  The Hong Kong Ministerial asks that the round 
be completed in calendar 2006.  World Bank experience shows that even after 
project identification, the process of project design and appraisal usually requires 
18 months to complete.  (Table 4.1. provides the timetable for a recently 
completed project.) Moreover, project identification and preparation presupposes 
the existence of an overall development strategy (for poorer countries, a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper).  Also in the background will be a Country Assistance 
Strategy, CAS.  The CAS, produced by the Bank in co-operation with the 
government and stakeholders in the country, outlines out a program of Bank 
Group support linked to the country’s development strategy.
22 
Given the platform to do so collectively does not yet exist and there is small 
likelihood that any Member will offer implementation audits for its proposals, the 
realistic alternatives must therefore accept that the rules or standards written 
into a Doha Development Agenda agreement will be unaudited when the 
agreement goes into effect.  The alternatives therefore are the following: 
1.  Implementation would not be a legal obligation.  Following the African Group 
proposal (TN/TF/W/56), acceptance of the new rules or standards as legal 
obligation would be taken up as a follow-up negotiation or review, and 
conditioned on provision by developed countries of assistance that is – in the 
view of the recipient country – effective, long-term, sustainable and adequate 
to implement the new commitments.   
2.  Implementation of unaudited obligations, as in the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, would be a legal obligation.  A developing member would be 
able to request an extension of implementation deadlines; discussion of that 
request would include an implementation audit and take up the provision of 
assistance.  The argument advanced by the African Group during the 
negotiations, as reflected in Table 4.2, goes quite a bit further, including 
binding obligations on special and differential treatment, call for specific 
technical assistance, and suggestion that trade facilitation needs are 
“enormous.” 
The first of these follows the thrust of the July 2004 Work Program.  It would 
include neither legal obligation to provide implementation assistance nor legal 
obligation to implement.  Rather than reaching balance in the manner Ricupero 
recommended – bound obligation to implement, bound obligation to provide 
assistance, it moves toward a nihilist balance – the agreement would obligate 
                                         
22 The World Bank webpage on “The Project Cycle” provides information on the steps in the 
process and links to information about particular projects.  From the Bank’s home page, click 
“Projects and Operations,” then “Project Cycle.” 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120731~menuPK:41
390~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html   14
neither.  It would provide only a target for future negotiation.  The second 
parallels the Uruguay Round outcomes that proved to be unsatisfactory.   15
Table 4.1: Timetable: Container Transport Project: World Bank – 
People's Republic of China Container Transport Project 
(SPC: State Planning Commission; SETC: State Economic and Trade Commission) 
1996  Project listed as a candidate project by the SPC 
November 1996  Bank project pre-identification mission 
May 1997  Bank project identification mission 
November 1997  First project preparation mission 
1997   Environmental impact analyst selected 
February 1998  Second project preparation mission 
March 1998  SETC approved the investment proposals from four provincial 
economic and trade commissions 
April 1998  Bank pre-appraisal mission 
July 1998  Appraisal 
1999  SPC approved SETC proposal to use World Bank loan to finance 
January 1999  Loan agreement negotiated 
March 1999  WB Board Approval 
September 1999  Loan agreement signed 
June 2001  One province withdrew – difficulty in connection with acquisition 
of land. 
November 2005  Implementation completion report 
Source: World Bank, Implementation Completion Report (SCL-44440) on a Loan 
in the Amount of US$71 Million to The People’s Republic of China for a 
Container Transport Project. Report No: 33620, November 18, 2005   16
 
Table 4.2: Summary Content of African Group Communication on Trade 
Facilitation (TN/TF/W/33 28 April 2005) 
 
For the African Group, enhanced special and differential treatment, technical 
assistance, capacity building and implementation assistance are critical 
components, (paragraph 5) 
Trade facilitation needs are enormous, intensive work is needed on how to: 
  reduce transport and communications costs, 
  enhance capacities of customs administrations, 
  better integrate African enterprises and economies into international 
payments and insurance systems (paragraph 6) . 
Cost implications of proposals for new commitments should be fully addressed 
(paragraph 7), 
Technical assistance and capacity building should be provided to assist during 
negotiations, to support: 
  identification of research and capacity building proposals, 
  needs assessments and prioritization, 
  travel for capital-based experts to participate in the negotiations 
(paragraph 9). 
Special and differential treatment should: 
  be legally binding, precise, effective, operational, 
  provide policy space and flexibility, 
  condition implementation on provision by developed countries of 
assistance that is – in the view of the recipient country – effective, long-
term, sustainable and adequate to implement the new commitments. 5. Progress on trade facilitation  
With regard to the roles of different institutions and agencies in trade facilitation, 
we have three points to make in this section: 
•  substantial support exists, coming from many agencies, 
•  the subject spans many matters, each with its own technical detail and 
expertise, 
•  for many of these it is difficult to separate the trade-related aspects from 
their general role in the overall economy. 
Current support 
There has been a substantial increase of trade-related assistance to developing 
countries over the past several years.  Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 report that the 
level of support is substantial, and government-business-related categories have 
been increasing rapidly.  From 2001 to 2004 support for trade facilitation, 
customs procedures and tariff reform more than tripled – increased at an annual 
rate of 52 percent.  
According to the 2005 Joint WTO/OECD Report on Trade-Related Technical 
Assistance and Capacity Building, the amount of trade-related technical 
assistance and capacity building (TRTA/CB) to help developing countries to 
participate more efficiently in international trade has increased by 50% since the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration in November 2001.
23 Assistance is provided within 
three categories:  
• Trade policy and regulations — to help countries reform and prepare for 
closer integration in the multilateral trading system — up from USD 0.65 billion 
in 2001-02 to USD 0.85 billion in 2003-04;  
• Trade development — to help enterprises to trade and create a favorable 
business climate — up from USD 1.3 billion to an average of USD 2.1 billion 
over the same period; and  
• Infrastructure — to help countries build the physical infrastructure to 
produce and move goods and export them — amounts to USD 9.3 billion in 
2003.  
Additional funding for "Aid for Trade" was announced by the world economic 
leaders at the December 2005 WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong. The European 
Union has announced it will increase its spending on trade- related aid to LDCs to 
1.2 billion dollars per year for the 2007-2013 period. This is in addition to EU 




                                         
23 “2005 Joint WTO/OECD Report on Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building”. 
Available at (www.oecd.org) 
24 “Aid for Trade: Remarks by Commissioner Mandelson at the IMF/World Bank Panel 
Discussion”. Available at (http://europa.eu.int/)    18
  U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman announced that the United States 
plans to more than double its contributions to global Aid for Trade, from $1.3 
billion in 2005 to $2.7 billion in grants annually by 2010. When trade-related 
physical infrastructure is included, the United States is the largest single-country 
provider of trade-related assistance – some $1.34 billion in FY2005, up 46 
percent from ($921 million) in FY2004 (more than double than FY2001).
25  Japan 
has pledged to provide 10 billion US dollars, by loan and grant, in trade, 
production, and distribution infrastructure over the next three years.  Japan’s 
program will include an exchange of some ten thousand trainees and experts in 
these fields during the same period.
 26   
 
                                         
25 The Office of the United States Trade Representative Press Release. Available at 
(www.ustr.gov). 
26 “Communication from Japan”. WT/MIN(05)/6. December 2005. WTO.   19
Table 5.1:  Trade-related aid from all donors, 2001-2004 
Category Æ  Amount (US$ millions) 
Year  Î   2001 2002 2003 2004 
Policy-Making             
Trade mainstreaming in PRSPs/development  plans  122  73 144 125 
Regional trade agreements   56  163  166  95 
WTO  Accession  13 25 27  8 
Dispute  settlement  3 3 3 2 
Trade and environment, competition,  investment  133 76 64 66 
Transparency  and  government  procurement  2 2 7 7 
Trade education/ training including in  negotiation  techniques  46 66 86 37 
Other  44 37 32 34 
Policy-Making  Totals  418 445 529 374 
              
Trade and Business Development              
Trade facilitation procedures, customs valuation and tariff reform  105  151  283  372 
Technical, sanitary and phyto-sanitary  standards  127 61  122 66 
Business support services and institutions  497  342  417  389 
Public-private sector networking  27  51  117  67 
E-commerce  2 37 31 54 
Trade  finance  413 336 384 461 
Trade promotion strategy and implementation  230  315  752  653 
Export market analysis and development  187  251  346  561 
Trade and Business Development  -  Totals  1,587 1,544 2,453 2,622 
              
Totals,  All  Above  2,005 1,989 2,982 2,996 
Source: OECD-WTO Trade Capacity-Building Data Base 















Figure 5.1: Commitments for Trade Related Aid 2001-2004  21
Scope of activities 
Trade facilitation spans a wide range of activities: for example, transportation, loading 
and unloading, trade finance, insurance, documentation to certify that quality, safety 
and health standards have been met, port charges, customs charges, classification, 
inspection, application or rebate of domestic taxes, time in transit, paperwork, 
disciplines against corruption and against smuggling.  Table 5.1 lists in aggregated 
categories the range of activities involved.  The WTO/OECD report of trade-related 
assistance lists some fifty-eight agencies that are involved, about equally split between 
bilateral and international.  The World Customs Organization is important among them, 
it provides assistance to identify problems as well as to implement reforms in the 
various parts of the customs process, and the International Trade Center assists 
particularly in marketing goods in international markets.  For agencies such as the 
bilateral development agencies and the development banks, trade facilitation is part of 
a broad program of assistance. At the World Bank, trade facilitation is a significant 
component of programs in many countries and engagement in new projects has been 
growing rapidly: 16 new projects with trade facilitation components for a total 
commitment of more than US$560 million were approved during the fiscal year 04. This 
more than doubles the number of projects and commitments from the previous year.  
Table 5.2 provides a summary of World Bank supported projects with trade facilitation 
components, including approved and projected projects through fiscal year 2006. 
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Table 5.2: World Bank Projects with Trade Facilitation Components 








Sub-Saharan Africa*  13  22  68  33  33  633 
Middle East &North Africa  2  2  8  9  5  331 
South Asia  2  2  158  10  8  358 
East Asia and Pacific  1  1  14  12  7  331 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  5  4  46  5  3  187 
Latin America and Caribbean  3  3  11  6  4  79 
TOTAL 26  34  305  75  60  1918 
* includes regional projects 
Source: “Trade Facilitation in the World Bank”. Available on the World Bank 
website. 
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Indicator of impact 
The cost of moving goods across borders is now as important as tariffs in 
determining their landed cost; an important element in such cost is the time 
goods spend in transit.  The vertical division of production across countries and 
the introduction of just-in-time inventory systems have added to the importance 
of such improvements.  For seasonal or fashion goods, cost of delay is more than 
the financing of inventories.  Untimely delivery can significantly diminish the 
value of the products to the distributor hence improvements in trade facilitation 
can have a significant impact on trade.  A recent study by Wilson, Mann and 
Otsuki (Wilson, Mann, Otsuki 2005b)quantified the conceptual experiment of 
improving trade facilitation processes in countries where they are least efficient.  
They estimated the impact of moving ‘below-average’ countries ‘halfway’ to the 
global average of four country-by-country indicators of (1) port efficiency, (2) 
customs environment, (3) own regulatory environment and (4) use of 
information technology. 
Overall, they estimate that world trade would increase by about 10 percent.  
Their work also provides interesting details, e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports 
would be affected more by their own reforms than by those of their trading 
partners.  Regarding domestic inefficiencies in trade facilitation processes, results 
show that they are a significant drag on realizing any countries' export potential. 
How improvements are made: examples 
An important operational difference between the trade effects of tariffs and of 
the quality of trade facilitation is that the measures of trade facilitation such as 
Wilson, et all, used are not direct measures of the factors that affect trade. They 
are indicators of such measures.  If the trade barrier in question is the tariff rate, 
change is accomplished by lowering the rate.  Improving the “Customs 
environment” might take many forms – dealing with corruption, providing for 
electronic data input, improving physical security in customs houses, etc.  The 
measure of “customs environment,” for example, is from a survey of customs 
users who ranked countries on a scale, taking into account and weighing in an 
unspecified way the various elements that influence the customs environment. 
Because improvements in trade facilitation can take many forms, examples of 
actual improvements provide a better sense of what improvement involves than 
do generic statements.  We will thus provide several such examples. 
Taiwan(China) express shipments
27 
Taiwan(China) in a submission to the WTO Negotiating Group on trade 
facilitation provides useful information on its establishing a mechanism for the 
speedy clearance of express consignments – this because "just-in-time" and 
"zero inventory" management techniques have become a critical element in 
                                         
27WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Communication From The Separate Customs 
Territory Of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen And Matsu, document /TF/W/44, 8 June 2005.   24
competitive business practice.  Taiwan(China) officials did not have to start from 
first principles; their system follows the World Customs Organization Guidelines 
for the Immediate Release of Consignments by Customs.  Furthermore, in setting 
up the system, officials took advantage of the Technical Assistance Program of 
the APEC Sub-Committee on Customs Procedures.  Key elements in the new 
procedure are 24/7 service, application of risk management techniques to 
minimize the number of shipments subject to physical inspection, introduction of 
other incentives that encourage self-compliance by shippers. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
report the results of the new system.   25
 
Table 5.3: Clearance time for express shipments, Taiwan(China) 
before and after reform 
Year  Average Clearance Time - hours
1996 48 
2005 2 
Source: WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Communication From The 
Separate Customs Territory Of Taiwan(China), Penghu, Kinmen And Matsu, 
document /TF/W/44, 8 June 2005. 
 
Table 5.4: Growth of volume of express and regular shipments 
Category  Growth 2001-2003 
annual percentage rate 
Express import and export shipments  58 
Regular import and export shipments  11 
Source: WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Communication From The 
Separate Customs Territory Of Taiwan(China), Penghu, Kinmen And Matsu, 
document /TF/W/44, 8 June 2005. 
The new system required 20 new processing lines, each with an X-ray scanning 
machine.  The Express Division offers and has a staff of 117 officers, mostly 
relocated from other divisions as the work load shifted.   26
Bolivia: Reforms of Customs Administration
28 
In Bolivia, taxes on imports provide 40 percent of national government revenues.  
Four-fifths of this revenue is from the application of economy-wide value-added 
and consumption taxes to imports, only one-fifth from customs duties. 
Before reform, the customs service was widely viewed within Bolivia as corrupt.  
Forty percent of staff was not salaried; their income was from keeping a part of 
the taxes collected.  Many employees were obligated to kick back a share of their 
income to the political officials who had assigned them to the customs service.  
Every shipment was subject to physical inspection, this inspection provided an 
opportunity for bargaining over entry.  Customs duties averaged over 20 percent, 
smuggling was pervasive.  Customs revenues lost because of smuggling were 
estimated to be $800 million/year, greater than the country’s foreign assistance 
receipts. 
Reform focused on the creation of a new personnel system – civil service – for 
customs.  The new system is based on job descriptions that provide objective 
qualifications by education, experience.  Potential employees are screened 
against qualifications by an independent consulting firm; the new system 
provides continuing training and bases promotions on training and performance.  
A computerized system (ASYCUDA++) was introduced.  The system is expected 
to reduce user costs; its mechanization of process should also increase the level 
of accountability in the system.
29  Direct inspection is now limited to 20 percent 
of declarations, randomly selected. 
The new system has received wide-spread private sector support, surveys 
indicate that this support is based on control of smuggling and of bribery, also on 
its protectionist impact vis-à-vis the informal sector, to which smuggled imports 
are important. 
To finance the new customs service the Customs Bureau retains a share of 
revenue collected.  The revenues available to the Customs Bureau are envied by 
other government agencies, where civil service reform does not have a dedicated 
source of financing and has been less successful.  In order to increase funding 
elsewhere the federal government has pressed to lower the percentage of 
revenues retained by Customs. 
Japan Paper-based versus Electronic-Data-Input Administrative costs 
Information from Japan allows comparison of trade administrative costs under a 
customs system based on electronic data input versus a system based on paper.  
The electronic system reduces the number of physical copies of information that 
must be distributed; it also facilitates verifying that the information used in one 
                                         
28Escobar, Flavio. 2004. “Bolivia,” Ch. 1, pp. 7-18 in Luc De Wulf and José B. Sokol (eds.) 
Customs Modernization Initiatives: Case Studies, Washington, DC, World Bank. 
29 De Wulf reports that stricter discipline over staff practices was a major reason for Ghana to 
install a computerized customs system.   27
part of the process is the same as that used in another.  Table 5.5 reports that 
savings can be significant, almost 40 percent of administrative costs.   28
Table 5.5: Trade administrative costs in Japan: Paper based documentation versus Electronic-Data-Input based 


















Common 16,706  10,197  39  19.1 12.8  33 
Special for agro-food products  9,864  7,884  20  4.2 3.7  12 
Total 26,570  18,081  32  23.3 16.5  29 
Source: OECD (2003) Quantitative Assessment of the Benefits of Trade Facilitation, Paris, OECD, document 
TD/TC/WP(2003)31/FINAL; based on JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization), 2002. Report on Market Access 
to Japan: Single Windows for Trade and Port-related Procedures (in Japanese). Tokyo. 
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Isolating the trade dimension 
The Wilson, et all, study brings forward the point that it is impractical in 
designing reforms to separate trade facilitation from improvements in the 
domestic business environment.  Their measure of use of information technology 
took into account the speed and cost of internet access and the extent of its use 
in the economy as a whole.  Likewise, the OECD in its survey of content of trade-
related assistance and capacity building. brings forward the following important 
points:
30 
•  Much of the support is to build trade-related infrastructure, e.g., seaport and 
airport facilities, and it is mostly in middle-income countries. 
•  Much of the work is linked to improvements of enterprise capacities, including 
capacity to meet technical and SPS standards. 
•  The focus of projects is usually on economy-wide improvements, e.g., of 
transport and communications infrastructure.  In practice it is difficult to 
separate support that will facilitate trade from improvements in the overall 
efficiency of the infrastructure. 
•  Improvements in the areas of trade facilitation that the Doha Negotiations 
have taken up are usually a part – a small part – of larger projects.  The 
basis for inclusion of such reforms is their contribution to the effectiveness 
of the project; not – strictly speaking – to achieve GATT compliance.  They 
usually involve application principles such as transparency, consistency and 
simplification that are much in the spirit of the relevant GATT articles. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
What has become of the implementation problem, of implementation-related 
issues and concerns? 
The short answer: the international community has taken it on aggressively 
through the development banks, bilateral aid agencies and other specialized 
institutions; at the WTO it has been constructively subsumed into a broader 
issue, aid-for-trade. 
At the WTO, the implementation issue is how to apply the WTO’s major 
instrument, multilaterally applicable legal obligation, to subjects where the 
development challenge is to build institutions rather than to remove restrictions.  
An important part of the issue is that WTO legal obligation applies to the trade 
dimensions of subjects that form the basic structure of the entire economy.  
Thus the development dimension is broader than the trade dimension.  The 
experience of development banks and agencies indicate that on such matters 
what works at one place and time may not work in another.  Legal obligation for 
development agencies is more than country-specific, it is project-specific; e.g., 
the content of customs reform projects will differ from country to country.  In 
such situations, multilateral obligation has limited usefulness, for the WTO to 
                                         
30 OECD (2005):   30
apply legal obligation on a country-specific, project-specific basis it would have to 
duplicate the work that development agencies are structured to do. 
On the negative side, The Doha Development Agenda has taken up the 
implementation problem as a challenge to restore mercantilist balance rather 
than a need to build good economics into future agreements.
31  For example, 
business services, viewed from a trade facilitation perspective, are a key input 
into modern industry.  Viewed this way, developing countries might see their 
own “concessions” in the services negotiations not only an opportunity to “buy” 
larger concessions from developed countries on merchandise of export interest, 
but also as a way to improve their industries’ access to world-class services and 
to stimulate improved quality of locally provided services.  Instead, the 
mercantilist view has been more prominent. Rather than focusing on 
improvements of services of trade facilitation interest to developing countries, 
emphasis has been on developed country concessions on services of export 
interest to developing countries. 
On the positive side, while the assistance discussion focused initially on capacity 
to participate in negotiations and to implement existing and new obligations, the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of December 2005 reveals that it has 
constructively broadened.  The broader subject, aid-for-trade, includes also the 
supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that developing 
countries need to profitably expand their trade.  Implementation is now being 
constructively subsumed into the broader consideration. 
Also on the positive side, the trade facilitation negotiations have brought forward 
proposals for mechanisms to determine links between obligations to implement 
and to provide assistance.  The proposed mechanisms reflect an appreciation of 
need for country specificity in such reforms; also an appreciation that it is 
difficult in multilateral negotiations to carry design of infrastructure to the level of 
specificity at which we know what to do and how much it will cost in each 
country.  However, for none of the proposals for new rules has there been or is 
there under way an implementation audit – a determination country-by-country 
of what implementation would involve and how much it would cost.  Negotiators 
have accordingly been cautious to create additional generic rules in this area.  
The limited scope that the Doha Development Agenda applies to negotiations on 
trade facilitation is another example of the growing appreciation of where 
different institutions’ comparative advantages lie. 
Caution in imposing legal obligations does not however suggest caution in finding 
new ways to monitor progress by WTO members in implementing new 
                                         
31 As Robert Hudec in his analysis has pointed out, the GATT system began with a cautious, 
“diplomat’s jurisprudence.” (Hudec 1970) Over time, Hudec has pointed out, the jurisprudence of 
the GATT/WTO system has changed, into a jurist’s jurisprudence in which careful legal analysis is 
demanded and the weight of legal obligation is an important force.  (Hudec 1999) There has 
been no parallel evolution of the soft, non-quantitative “diplomat’s economics” with which the 
GATT began. (Finger 2005)   31
obligations.  Such monitoring can be a productive input to the provision of new 
development assistance such as may be provided under an Aid for Trade 
program.   The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is one option to serve as 
a platform to achieve this goal.   
The TPRM was established in 1988 and the Marrakesh Agreement made this 
review process a formal part of the WTO.  Each review of members’ trade 
policies are conducted with the goal of increased transparency – and was 
intended to include broader economic factors and development goals.  The four 
largest members based on total share of world trade – currently the United 
States, Japan, Canada, the European Community – are reviewed every two 
years, the next sixteen members by share every four years, with other under 
discussion every six years.  The latter category includes the least developed 
countries.   
The TPRM has received little attention in development discussions; however it is 
reasonable to assume that if sufficiently supported, in-country advocates of 
continued reform could use a Trade Policy Review as an effective instrument for 
further progress.  Rather than creating either an entirely new mechanism within 
the WTO – or another “coordinating” facility outside the WTO to review and seek 
to channel development aid funding – building on this existing platform merits 
consideration.   
One could consider extending a Trade Policy Review beyond a tabulation of 
existing policy structures to include an assessment of where trade-related 
assistance would be most productive.  A specialized “Trade Facilitation Review 
Report,” conducted more frequently than the complete Trade Policy Review for a 
country might be considered.  In this way the frequency of reviews of aid-for-
trade needs could be conducted, say, on a two-year cycle for the least developed 
countries without increasing the frequency of the full reviews.  A focus on trade-
related assistance might increase the attention paid within the country to the role 
trade can play in development.  The positive – and legally speaking, informal – 
approach such reviews might take to bringing a developing countries regulations 
and institutions up to international standards could also serve as an alternative to 
raising implementation questions through the dispute settlement process. 
A modest agenda at the WTO would not impede the international community 
from moving aggressively to build trade-related capacities in developing 
countries.  As we have documented, much is already under way and the pace is 
increasing.  Emphasis moving away from the WTO is a matter of the 
international community appreciating which of its institutions have comparative 
advantage where.
32  
                                         
32 In the WTO context, the rationale for creating an international obligation is often to overcome 
domestic inertia that prevents profitable reforms from being made.  The experiences we have 
reviewed indicate that momentum, not inertia, characterizes international support for trade 
facilitation.  Another basis for caution in imposing rules where much is being accomplished   32
Things can happen for the best without there happening as the international 
community initially foresaw.  As World War II neared its end leaders of the 
international community saw a need for three new economic institutions: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Trade Organization.  The 
World Bank and the IMF were established and have served well.  The 
international community however could not agree to create an international 
organization to regulate and to manage trade; settled in 1948 for an improvised 
and limited commercial agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 
One might from this predict that while development and monetary affairs have 
been well-managed, world trade has floundered.  Of course, that is not the case.  
Trade has expanded more rapidly than national outputs and contributed to 
increased economic prosperity and political stability.  The improvised commercial 
agreement has served well. 
What the international community does not achieve in one way it can accomplish 
in another.  Slow progress with the current round of negotiations, the Doha 
Development Agenda, does not necessarily mean that nothing is happening to 
take on development issues, even those that are related to trade.  Though the 
Doha Development Agenda is moving slowly, through development banks and 
through bilateral agencies the international community is doing much to build 
trade-related capacities in poorer countries. 
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8. Annex: Examples in detail of trade facilitation 
projects 
Cambodia Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness Project 
(2005)  
The project includes the following components:  
Trade Facilitation – The project will create an electronic “Single Window” 
through which an exporter or importer will be able to discharge all trade 
regulatory requirements.  In particular, it will automate key functions of the 
Customs and Excise Department, and link Customs, the Ministry of Commerce, 
the Port Authority of Sihanoukville and others through a technology network.  It 
will replace the dozens of manual documents with a single electronic interface, 
eventually to include payment systems. This will be led by the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Customs and Excise Department.  
Export Market Access Fund (EMAF) – The project will create a $1.6 million 
matching grant fund that exporters can use to cover half of the cost of 
developing new export markets, and particularly on achieving market standards 
required to export. The fund will finance (a) technical support to the Ministry of 
Commerce's Department of Export Promotion to establish the exporter technical 
assistance window, and (b) a technical assistance matching grant facility that 
would cover 50 percent of the cost of achieving market standards, or evidence of 
compliance with those standards. 
Private Participation in Infrastructure and Investment Promotion – A 
program of capacity building to implement the Law on Concessions and the 
Amended Law on Investment. 
The Legal Transparency Component – The project will create a Khmer 
language website to publish all Cambodian laws and the final judgments of all 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals’ cases; and training to use the established 
systems. 
The innovative dimension of the project is to use transparency, competition, and 
regulatory streamlining to improve the private sector’s capacity to make 
investment and trade decisions, and to increase the efficiency of public service 
delivery.  The technology investments will help cement these reforms and make 
the interface between the Government and private sector faster and less 
vulnerable to corruption.  These changes will save time and money that 
businesses can use to focus on competition and growth. 
Electronic Single Window. This component will finance the development and 
implementation of information technology to integrate and automate the trade 
regulatory and facilitation functions of all key agencies through a shared 
electronic trade network (tentatively called “CamTradeNet”). This system will 
allow direct trader input of Customs declarations and other information required 
by the regulatory agencies in an integrated electronic form. It will facilitate the   36
sharing of this entered information electronically by the Government, thereby (a) 
eliminating the need for multiple, often duplicative requests for information and 
the associated time and resources; (b) increasing the speed and accuracy of the 
disposition of regulatory functions, and (c) reducing opportunities for unofficial 
charges. 
The resultant electronic “single window” for all border processing and clearance 
related formalities will make a significant contribution to the achievement o f the 
government’s trade facilitation objectives by lowering transaction costs and 
reducing clearance times. Ensuring appropriate interconnectivity between core 
government agencies and private sector traders (to allow direct trader input of 
declarations and associated documentation) and banks (to facilitate the payment 
of duties and taxes) is an essential element.  
UNCTAD’s ASYCUDA automated Customs processing system. The system 
will provide the IT support necessary to introduce a range of modem approaches 
to Customs administration including risk management and post clearance audit. 
The ASYCUDA system has been deployed in a number of countries throughout 
the world and the latest version of the product is designed to support selective 
examinations, trader compliance incentives, effective management of Customs 
clearance, payment schemes to facilitate trade and secure duty and tax 
collection, and the production of more accurate and timely trade statistics. 
The component will finance the procurement and effective implementation of the 
ASYCUDA system in Customs including the provision of appropriate technical 
assistance to ensure effective implementation of the system and its seamless 
integration with non-automated system and procedures. The component will also 
finance the development and implementation of a continuity network to provide 
an electronic Single window to ensure traders are able to discharge all their 
regulatory responsibilities through one gateway. As a part of this development, a 
number of small agency-specific systems will need to be developed and 
implemented to ensure all key import/export related processes are able to be 
undertaken electronically. 
Source: The World Bank, Project Appraisal Document 
 
Tunisia Export Development Project (1999- Present)  
The Government, with World Bank support through the Export Development 
Project, initiated new measures in 1999 to systematically tackle trade facilitation 
issues, starting with the simplification and automated processing of trade 
documents.  The project focused on improving the information exchange 
associated with cargo handling and clearance activities, through the use of 
information and communications technologies, and initiating measures in view of 
simplification of customs and inspection procedures. 
Document simplification and standardization. Providing a foundation for 
the reforms were the simplification of and adoption of international standards for   37
trade documentation initiated a few years earlier with the support of the 
European Commission, and significant coordination among the various 
stakeholders. Five documents previously required by the authorities were re-
designed – two documents were eliminated, while the remaining (the Titre du 
Commerce Exterieur (TCE), customs declaration, and technical control 
documents) were redesigned to reduce duplication and to standardize 
terminology.  The customs declaration was aligned to international standards.  In 
addition, two of the four documents required for goods removal were eliminated. 
The development of electronic formats for trade documents made it possible 
both to share information amongst the various stakeholders and to process the 
information contained within the documents.   
Tunisia Trade Net System (TTN). Building on this foundation, a key initiative 
was the creation of a semi-public agency (TTN) in February 2000 to create and 
operate a value-added network that would provide electronic data interchange 
(EDI) for stakeholders and to expedite flows and processing of trade documents. 
TTN shareholders include 10 government agencies, among which are the 
national port authority and Tunis Air, and 18 private sector units, among which 
are several banks and the Tunisian Internet Agency. The system interfaces with 
all agencies involved in international trade procedures, including the Tunisian 
Customs, Ministry of Commerce, technical control agencies, Central Bank, ports, 
as well as the private sector traders, agents, freight forwarders, customs brokers 
and banks. 
Three main sets of documents are processed through the TTN system: the TCE, 
customs declaration, and technical control documents.  In addition, the system 
processes on-line tariff payments.  A single connection to the central server 
enables each participant to exchange documents and messages with other 
participants. Shipping manifests and customs declarations are sent over the 
network, thereby reducing processing time.  The manifest data for Customs is 
also available to the cargo handling operator in electronic format, eliminating 
data capture by the latter and improving planning and operational processes. 
TTN provides a flexible user interface: Trade professionals (customs brokers, 
freight forwarders, ship agents, etc…) use client based applications that are 
designed to handle processing of large numbers of transactions whereas 
occasional users can opt for a web-based interface. 
TTN employs 45 staff, 25 of which are experts in information technology. TTN 
users enter into a contract with TTN to access the network for a monthly service 
subscription fee of about US$70, as well as a processing fee per document (US$3 
for each of the three required documents). TTN users can access the system 
through the web or personal computer interfaces. 
Other initiatives.  A number of other initiatives were necessary to complement 
the above actions.  These included, (a) the enhancements to the customs 
computer system to support international message and document standards for   38
automation of manifest acquittal and processing of customs declarations;
33 (b) 
development of information systems of the Ministry of Commerce to 
electronically process approvals for restricted goods through TTN, eliminating 
manual delivery/collection of the TCE to/from the Ministry of Commerce; and (c) 




Although the full impact of the above initiatives has not yet been realized, there 
is evidence that the investments made in trade facilitation are dramatically 
reducing import and export processing times.  Imported goods can now be 
cleared in 3 days, compared to an average of 7 days a few years ago.  For 
example, manifest processing after the completion of vessel operations used to 
take up to 4 days.  Electronic processing has cut that time to within one or two 
days.  Payment of customs duties, storage duties, and port duties now takes only 
a few hours, rather than a full day.  The time needed to prepare and process 
customs declarations has dropped to 15 minutes, down from as long as three 
days.  The physical inspection of goods during the year 2002 has reached 
targeted level of 15%, from 20% in 1999. 
Electronic processing of ship manifests has led to resource savings for the 
maritime cargo handling operator from the elimination of data capture and 
improved vessel and yard operations resulting from earlier availability of accurate 
data. Moreover, the TTN experience has demonstrated the positive impact of 
information technology within the government in improving efficiency for 
administrative processes. The TTN platform is therefore now being considered 
for the implementation of e-procurement services and other e-government 
applications. 
Success Factors 
Tunisia’s experience points to the dramatic improvements that can be made in 
trade clearing process when administrative and political commitment joins forces 
with advances in information technology. But there is much more involved than 
simply applying information technology to trade documents.  Perhaps the most 
important prerequisite is the commitment at the highest level of government.  
This was made possible in Tunisia by close involvement of the Minister of 
Commerce, who was also the chairman of the Superior Export and Investment 
Council, a cross-ministerial committee reporting directly to the President of 
                                         
33 The procedural changes in the customs information system enabled: (a) risk management, by 
allowing comparison of data submitted through the declaration against pre-defined parameters to 
determine non-conforming patterns; (b) transparent, more rapid and consistent processing of 
customs declarations and elimination of routine manual checks; and (c) reduction of personal 
contact between declarants with customs officials. 
34 Although not a perfect substitute, scanning and analysis of a full container loan now takes an 
average of two minutes, whereas complete manual verification requires up to 12 hours and three 
customs staff.  At the port of Rades, the use of the scanners has contributed to the reduction of 
about 65% in parking area for trucks waiting for container verification.     39
Tunisia.  The second success factor was the cooperation among private sector 
operators and various government stakeholders at all stages of the process.  This 
was achieved by setting a steering committee and a technical committee 
composed of key stakeholders at the early stages of the process.  These 
committees were instrumental not only for the design of the initiatives, but also 
in their implementation. 
The third was the adoption of a regulatory framework that allowed for electronic 
processing and signature.  Amendments to the legal framework were made to 
accommodate the following changes: (a) layout of the simplified Liasse Unique 
documents (Decree from Ministry of Commerce 22 November 99, Notice from 
Ministry of Commerce 28 October 2000, Notice from Ministry of Commerce 14 
November 2000); (b) the supply of value added network services through 
telecommunications and the Internet (Act 15 January 2001 from Ministry of 
Telecommunications); (c) new streamlined customs declaration procedure 
through the TTN (Notice from Ministry of Finance 15 January 2001); (d) new 
procedures for submission and processing of documents for external trade 
through the TTN system (Joint Notice of 20 April 2001 from Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Transport); and (e) the 
recognition of legal validity of electronic documents and electronic signature (Act 
of  13 June 2000). 
Other success factors included: (a) the simplification of customs requirements; 
(b) the extension of electronic processing to all import and export administration 
and other agencies involved in trade transactions, and developing their “back-
offices” to handle electronic processing of trade documents; (c) the adoption of 
internationally recognized standards and codes in order to ensure a common 
language among different users and in different countries; (d) aligning the 
relative costs of processing paper documentation and on-line processing. 
China highways improvement 
A final example will illustrate the detail at which trade facilitation projects are 
drawn.  It provides a few examples of the monitorable objectives of a highways 
improvement projected intended to better integrate the Hubei province of China 
with poorer regions, particularly to the west of that central province.  Examples 
of objectives are listed in the Annex Table below.  The table indicates that the 
results of the project will be measured and evaluated at various levels; not only 
by the number of kilometers or roadways improved, but also by the increase of 
traffic on these roads, the increase of availability of bus and truck common 
carriers, the cost of such services. 
The table provides only a few examples from the nine-page list of objectives that 
will be monitored in connection with the project.  It would be difficult to define 
and quantify such objectives so that the same requirements were imposed on 
even two projects in the same country; perhaps impossible to do so across 
countries.   40
Annex Table: Example of detail of project documents: 
Monitorable objectives at various levels in the 
World Bank – People’s Republic of China  
Hubei Shiman Highway Project to 
Integrate a central province with poorer regions 
 
Social objectives 
  Increased output of agriculture and industrial goods 
  Increased school enrollment 




  Kilometers of roads maintained with new techniques, 
  Frequency of maintenance 
Roads management  
Number of staff trained Management, financing systems installed 
Safety and Safety Management 
  Installation of a safety management plan 
  Numbers of vehicles inspected 
 
Work schedule  
Percentage of existing road freight and passenger transport enterprises 
systematically screened in accordance with safety requirements, procedures and 
monitoring arrangements of the Safety Review Process:  
  Targets: Year 4, 50%; Year 5, 75%; Year 6, 100%. 
  Frequency of reports: Annual reports. 
 
Results objectives, improvements of 
  Average daily traffic on different routes  
  Number of days roads, bridges are closed  
  Breakdown rates 
  Increased availability of common carrier services; trucks and busses 
  Transport costs, rates charged 
–––––––––––– 
Source: World Bank (2004) Project Appraisal Document, Report Number: 27681-
CHA, May 25, 2004 
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